Transgovernmentalism Meets Security: Police Liaison Officers, Terrorism and Statist Transnationalism by Aydinli, E. & Yon, H.
Transgovernmentalism Meets Security:
Police Liaison Ofﬁcers, Terrorism, and
Statist Transnationalismgove_1512 55..84
ERSEL AYDINLI* and HASAN YÖN*
Studies of transgovernmental activities have enhanced our understanding
of changing global politics, but their claims have not been fully investigated
with respect to the security realm. Therefore, this article ﬁrst acknowledges
a gap between the practices and capacities of nonstate entities creating
transnational threats and those of state-based agents of response. States’
ability to respond to these threats has been questioned. Is this skepticism
warranted or have states begun adapting and developing new responses to
address nonstate security challenges? This article looks at transgovernmen-
tal responses to transnational terrorism and identiﬁes an unconventional
group of substate pioneers, police liaison ofﬁcers (PLO), making moves into
the transnational realm. Data collected through interviews with interna-
tional PLOs reveal these activities to be characterized by increasing
informality, depoliticization, and demonopolization of global security
cooperation. This cooperation nevertheless maintains its strong ties with
state legitimacy and capacity, and is therefore conceptualized here as statist
transnationalism.
Introduction
The nature of global security threats has changed, from the primacy of
state-based challenges during the Cold War era to the rise of transnational
issues and nonstate actor challengers of recent years. These transnational
threats have been linked to such diverse sources as environmental degra-
dation, disease, and migration, to crime and terrorism,1 and their growing
signiﬁcance has spawned various efforts to describe and reconceptualize
security in world politics (Baldwin 1997; Buzan, Waever, and deWilde
1997; Dupont 2001; Mandel 1999). It can be generally agreed upon,
though, that we have entered into an era in which newly empowered
forces—from individuals to associations or organizations of various levels
of formality—have been released,2 not only in the realms of economic,
social, or political issues but also in that of security. Widespread accep-
tance of changes in the nature of security threats naturally raises questions
about what these changes might mean for the traditional responder to
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global threats, the state. Are states also changing? Are they adapting their
response practices to meet these new threats, or are they failing to do so
and thus becoming increasingly irrelevant?
To explore this question it is necessary to consider a nonstate, transna-
tional security threat that has managed to generate broad state response,
and examine the range and nature of that response. An appropriate
example of such a threat is terrorism. Since the attacks of 9/11 in particu-
lar, “new” characteristics of terrorism have been pointed out, all of which
emphasize the increasingly nonstatist, transnational nature of many ter-
rorist groups and incidents. These include a shift in “new” terrorist
groups’ organizational structure from hierarchical to networked and
decentralized (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini 1999), these groups’ increas-
ing use of information technology both for communication purposes as
well as for attacks (Coll and Glasser 2005; Denning 2002; Hinde 2001; Stohl
2006), and a broadening—globalizing—of strategies to achieve goals that
may or may not remain relatively local. Also noted has been “new” ter-
rorism’s increasingly religious nature (Juergensmeyer 2003; Sedgwick
2004) (transnational in its being not directly associated with a particular
nation) and ﬁnally, a reduced, if not eliminated, reliance on state sponsor-
ship for survival (Kittner 2007; Newman 2007; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002).
As for the response, unlike other nonstate transnational security chal-
lenges like environmental degradation, refugee crises, and human or
small arms trafﬁcking, this “new,” transnational terrorism, as generally
associated with al Qaeda and radical Jihadism, has indeed provoked a
major international response. It has managed to garner greater state inter-
est than other nonstate security challenges ﬁrst because its targets have
included the world hegemon and other inﬂuential Western countries, and
also because of the inevitable response cycle that terrorist attacks
demand—in order to appease public fear and outrage, governments feel
obliged to respond without delay and generally without restraint. By
looking therefore at states’ countering practices toward transnational ter-
rorism, it may be possible to ﬁnd evidence of whether states are indeed
adapting in their responses to new transnational security threats.
In this article we argue that states are adapting and that evidence for
this can be found in the increasingly accepted and institutionalized use of
liaisons, particularly police liaisons, in response to transnational threats.
Although liasionship in itself is not a new phenomenon, the number of
liaisons has been growing in recent years and there is evidence to suggest
that the nature of liaison activity is changing, from an ad hoc response to
various threats to a regular, established practice of state-supported trans-
national security enforcement. This last point is of particular signiﬁcance:
Liaison activity is occurring within the security realm, a realm that has
traditionally remained within the tight and exclusive control of the state.
Changes and signs of adaptation in this realm may therefore be construed
as signs of adaptation on the part of states, as an attempt to support
innovative strategies for the governance of new transnational challenges.
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The article ﬁrst provides an overview of perspectives taken on the
question of whether states are in decline, considering views from the
international relations scholarship on globalization and the state as well as
from the literature on governance. We then look at transgovernmental
efforts being made by substate actors to combat transnational security
challenges, and in particular, transnational terrorism. The following
section focuses on what emerges as a particularly vibrant area of state-
based response activity—police liaison ofﬁcers (PLOs)—and explores the
extent and types of developments in the appointments and practices of
PLOs as possible evidence of states’ adaptation capacity with respect to the
transnationalization of (in)security.
States and Governance in Transition
A variety of scholars in recent decades have considered—either directly or
indirectly—the question of the state’s ability to adapt to changes in pat-
terns of global politics and therefore remain a relevant actor. These schol-
ars have come from various theoretical and paradigmatic backgrounds
and have not only approached the question in very different manners but
also come to varying conclusions. While there seems to be little doubt
among all of them that the state and its governing practices are changing
(Burris, Kempa, and Shearing 2008), there remains considerable disagree-
ment about how it is changing and what the implications of that change
might be for the state itself. Nevertheless, two general patterns can be
traced: Some see the state and the state system as being in decline and of
decreasing relevance, and some do not.
Within the broad international relations literature, among scholars
exploring the question of how the state is coping in an era of transnational
growth, there are those who have come to the conclusion that the state is
in decline (e.g., Ferguson and Mansbach 2007; Mathews 1997; Ohmae
1995; Sassen 1996; Strange 1996) and that the state can no longer be
considered the sole governing body (Fidler 2004; Ruggie 2003; Stiglitz
2002; Zurn 2004). Such a view of states’ apparent incapacity to adapt and
thus maintain their dominant grip on power would lead to the assump-
tion that in security issues, with new actors and challenges rising on one
side but traditional actors and response approaches still prevalent on
the other, a gap must emerge between the practices and capacities of the
nonstate entities creating transnational challenges and threats, and the
practices and capacities of the state-based agents of response. A failure or
inability to adapt would mean that the state-based responders are not
taking advantage of the very changes that are allowing the threats to
evolve. It would indicate that while global ideational, material, or scientiﬁc
transformations in principle provide everyone opportunities to ﬂourish
and develop, it is the transnational nonstate actors who seem to have an
inherent advantage over the more bureaucratic actors and patterns of the
international realm. While such a gap between threat and response would
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not necessarily mean that the state no longer has any signiﬁcance or rel-
evance in countering security threats, it would contribute to an image of
the state as a “dinosaur at the end of the Cretaceous period, powerful but
cumbersome, not yet superseded, but no longer the unchallenged masters
of their environment” (Singer 2001/02, 213).
Another large body of scholarship dealing with changes in the state is
that on governance, in which we also ﬁnd works—this time a clear
majority—attesting to the decline of the state. Again there is the claim that
the state is in decline because the forces of globalization (Teubner 2004), as
well as considerable work arguing that the new era of governance can be
better described using a “network” metaphor that captures the idea of
power and authority shifting away from monolithic states toward an
increasing distribution among nonstate and hybrid bodies (Bevir and
Rhodes 2003a; Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller 2003; Burris, Drahos, and Shear-
ing 2005; Castells 2000; Scott 2000; Slaughter 2001). These ideas overlap
broadly with the transgovernmental perspective in IR, which also takes as
a starting point the idea that the state can no longer be considered as a
unitary whole but must be treated as a disaggregated entity. The trans-
governmental perspective is based on Keohane and Nye’s (1974) long-
standing distinction of activity occurring between “sub-units of
governments on those occasions when they act relatively autonomously
from higher authority in international politics,” and highlights the process
of “substate” authorities building up transgovernmental capacities on
their own, in the sense of coordinating and building up networks with
other substate entities.
In terms of exactly who these various agencies gaining power at the
expense of the state are, considerable scholarship has been devoted to
discussion of corporate power at the local, national, and inter/
supranational levels (Bevir and Rhodes 2003a, 2003b; Bevir, Rhodes, and
Weller 2003; Freeman 2000; Shearing 2005), with certain strong arguments
being made that private corporations actually are the government in some
communities (Sinden 2007). In terms of the ways in which this power shift
has been occurring, the global business regulation literature in particular
has explored how legal and cultural conditions have enabled corporations
to take means of governance authority away from public authorities
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Drahos and Braithwaite 2003; Levi-Faur
2005; Moran 2002; Scott 2002). Additionally, works on autonomous regu-
latory authorities have explored the ways in which public authorities
themselves have delegated power away from bureaucrats to professionals
and technocrats, leading to what has been dubbed “indirect representative
democracies” (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005).
A growing body of both IR and governance scholarshipmakes the point
that the state is not only no longer the only way of governance, it is also not
the best way when it comes to dealing with such issues as the environment
(Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; DesRues 2005; Jonas and Bridge 2003; Selin and
VanDeveer 2005), human rights (Cardenas 2003a, 2003b) international
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development (Diawara 2000), health (Cohen2006;Kickbusch2005, 2006), or
even legal matters (Eberlein and Newman 2008; Newman 2008; Raustiala
2002). Often this work explores the growing authority of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) (Braithwaite 2006; Collingwood and Logister 2005;
Haque 2004; Spiro 2007). In these cases, power for the NGOs is generally
attributed to these organizations’ inﬂuential role in keeping particular
issues on the global agenda. The argument ismade that for some issues, for
example human rights, medicine, trade, and agriculture, the role of NGOs
and NGO networks is crucial (Csete 2004; Sell 2004). In extreme cases,
NGOs such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation are seen as having
taken virtual control of the agenda on a particular issue (Cohen 2006).
With respect to the question of security-related issues, the general
arguments of a shifting of power away from the state have again been
made, again most often with an emphasis on a move to agencies outside
of the state. There are frequent references to the privatizing of security
forces in general (deNevers 2009a, 2009b; Krahmann 2010; Singer 2004a),
the privatizing of policing3 in particular (Juska 2009; Kempa, Stenning, and
Wood 2004; Wakeﬁeld 2003), and to the regulatory options for such private
security forces (Avant 2005; Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007; Holmqvist
2005; Percy 2006; Schreier and Caparini 2005; Singer 2004b; Spear 2006).
The overall growth of security-related networks has been also pointed out
(Adamson 2005), and the need for exploring networks in transnational
security issues has been expressed both for methodological purposes
(Krahmann 2005) and as a means for countering terrorism (Gerspacher
and Dupont 2007). Loss of state power in security issues has also been
viewed from the perspective of looking at the threatening nonstate actors
themselves and exploring how their use of violent power raises risk
factors, and thus “controls” governance through force or threat of force
(Beck 1999; Garland 2000; Raab and Milward 2003).
Despite such arguments to the contrary, many scholars maintain that
predictions of the state’s demise have been overestimated (Krasner 1999;
Lagon 2003; Paul and Hall 1999; Paul, Ikenberry, and Hall 2003; Weiss
1998). After 9/11 in particular, the point has been made that the new
threats or the severity of them have brought about a return of the state
(Fukuyama 2004; Hall 2002; Telhami 2006). With failed or failing states
viewed by many as breeding grounds for various transnational threats but
most potently, terrorism (Dorff 2005; Krasner and Pascual 2005; Piazza
2008; Rotbert 2002), the argument goes that security is to be found in a
renewed promotion of states and the protecting of state sovereignty. It is
perhaps not a coincidence that particularly with respect to security issues,
it is more difﬁcult to ﬁnd arguments of the state’s diminishing power
(Crawford 2006; Loader and Walker 2006; Zedner 2003); rather, the ten-
dency is either toward seeking ways of strengthening state response
(Loader and Walker 2007) or toward arguing that (particularly post-9/11)
state power has gained excessively and must be kept under control
(O’Reilly and Ellison 2006). Even among those who see a branching out of
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state power into network structures, the argument has been made that
states may actually gain strength—because of their role of still being the
coordinating transmitters of decisions to various agencies (Shearing 2005).
Similarly, the extensive work done on “reinventing government” looks at
ways of transforming state structures in order to increase their capacity to
control diffused power from a centralized position, for example, in the
form of the regulatory state (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Levi-Faur 2005;
Moran 2002)
While both perspectives on the state’s position in global politics make
reasonable arguments, when it comes to security, both also have short-
comings, largely stemming from the failure of either side to clearly base
their position on substantive empirical evidence of states’ actual response
practices. This is ﬁrst true for those who say that rising threats and fear-
fulness lead people to turn to states for help, and therefore the importance
of the state remains strong. Events of the last decade in Iraq orAfghanistan
may have brought back a sense of appreciation for the state and given a
boost to the idea that a lack of state control and protection leads to greater
insecurity; however, such a conclusion cannot be automatically construed
as a sign that states are indeed successfully adapting to meet the new
kinds of challenges and provide the necessary security. In other words,
resumed desire for an all-protecting state does not mean that the state can
effectively ﬁll this role. Turning to those who have suggested that the role
of the state is shrinking, the assumption with respect to adaptability is
presumably that the state either cannot or does not want to adapt, which is
why it is gradually being replaced by other actors. Naturally, the tendency
has been, therefore, to concentrate on the new—and thus more
interesting—responding actors, speciﬁcally, nonstate responders to secu-
rity. There are some who have looked directly at the state, but these have
emphasized the legal dilemmas that emerge when states try to adapt to
dealing with nonstate transnational threats (Behr 2008; Messina 2008;
Ramasamy 2006). There remains scarce coverage of actual security-related
transgovernmental activities, in the sense of those transborder activities
being conducted by substate entities. The question remains, therefore,
what such a transgovernmental perspective might reveal about the
current state of the state with respect to security, and, speciﬁcally, to the
question of whether states are adapting their response practices to meet
new challenges.
Transgovernmental Initiatives for Transnational Security Governance:
The Case of Police Liaisons
If initiatives for combating transnational security threats are placed on a
continuum ranging from the transborder actions of ofﬁcial representatives
of unitary nation states (international activity) to transborder actions by
completely nonstate actors (transnational activity), activity occurring in
between the two—or combining the two—will be considered here as
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transgovernmental practices. Although undoubtedly a part of the state
realm and acting on behalf of their nation states, transgovernmental actors
may in practice lean closer to the transnational.
In the security realm, transgovernmental activity between state-related
actors is not easy to ﬁnd evidence of—perhaps because such activity is not
that common on the part of state security providers or perhaps because of
the often closed nature of, for example, intelligence services. There is
evidence, however, of such activity occurring among the police. Long-
standing examples include cooperation among groups like the Interna-
tional Police Association, the International Association of Women Police,
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the International
Police Executive Symposium, as well as regional groups like the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations Chiefs of National Police and the South
AsianAssociation for Regional Cooperation, the Eastern, Western, Central
and Southern Africa Police Chiefs Organizations, and in North America,
the International Association of Chiefs of Police. In South America there
are similar initiatives, for example, within the trading block formed by
Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay (MERCOSUR), member nation
police forces have regular meetings to discuss police matters, and
exchanges of personnel and training are common. These organizations
have contributed to shared understandings among police ofﬁcers around
the world in different ways, from increasing social interactions among its
members to organizing conferences to discuss speciﬁc police problems.
They do not necessarily serve, however, the aim of improving the global
countering potential against transnational terrorism because they lack the
jurisdiction and muscle to enforce wide-reaching security cooperation
practices.
Other long-standing examples of transgovernmental police activity
include the regular meetings of the heads of police from Berlin, Bratislava,
Budapest, Munich, Prague, and Vienna (Edelbacher 2001) and the close
cooperation that has existed since the 1980s in the tri-national Upper Rhine
Area between the police departments of Basel (Switzerland), Freiburg
(Germany), and Mulhouse (France) (Mohler 2001). Substate efforts at the
level of the national police include those by the Netherlands, who have
established Police Partnership Programs with Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic, for purposes of exchanging professional knowledge and
experience, and building up mutual understanding and respect (Mlicki
2001), and the well-known example of police cooperation that exists
between France and England for the purpose of securing the Channel
Tunnel Region.
Turning more speciﬁcally to transgovernmental police cooperation
efforts to counter transnational terrorism, interesting developments have
taken place in the past decade. The Metropolitan Police of London and its
Counter Terrorism Command, once a purely local department, has taken
responsibility for counterterrorism investigations not only in London but
throughout the United Kingdom and abroad. It serves as the “single point
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of contact for international partners in counter-terrorism” with an ability to
“investigate overseas attacks against British interests” (Metropolitan
Police of London nd). Other recent innovations can be seen in New York
City, where the local police department (NYPD) has begun sending its
own police ofﬁcers to work in a variety of countries, including England,
Jordan, Singapore, Israel, Canada, France, and the Dominican Republic.
The NYPD has also employed a Turkish-origin nonofﬁcer to serve as a
liaison between the NYPD and the Muslim community at large. He is
ofﬁcially entitled as a community coordinator but carries a police ID and
works at police headquarters directly under the police commissioner. He
is involved with the establishing of NYPD liaison ofﬁces around the world
and describes his role in working with them in this way:
Ofﬁcers have my name in their phone books. When they need to know anything
special about Islam or Islamic culture, they just call me and ask. I inform them
about what they would like to learn . . . I take part during the international visits
of police forces from Muslim countries to NYPD and Raymond Kelly. This
situation surprises visiting delegations because although I am originally a civil-
ian I have a role in ofﬁcial circles. (interviewed in New York by authors, March
3, 2007)
This civilian-ofﬁcer stressed his close working relationship with the
police commissioner, which may, interestingly, point to a potential short-
coming of this type of local initiatives: Although they constitute positive
moves, they may be completely ad hoc and reliant on a single
individual—in this case New York Police Commissioner Raymond
Kelly—and thus run the risk of being discontinued or sidelined when a
new person takes over.
The NYPD experience is a small-scale example of what is perhaps the
most widely known and also the most rapidly expanding and diversifying
practice of transgovernmental activity for combating transnational secu-
rity challenges: police liaisonship. Although not a new practice—liaisons
have been used since the times of an earlier transnational security threat
(the Anarchists; see Aydinli 2008) and became common practice in
the peaking era of another transnational threat (international drug
trafﬁcking)—their increased use in recent years and the understanding of
the adaptability of this form of response to counter transnational threats
seems to guarantee that they will only gain in importance in the future.
The idea of police liaisons refers most commonly to the practice of either
government to international organization appointments (national police
organizations sending police ofﬁcers to serve in an international structure
like Europol) or government to government (appointing police liaisons in
a bilateral manner between two states). Traditionally, bilateral liaisonships
have been established between the central police structures of two coun-
tries, although in some cases, bilateral liaison ofﬁcers may be used as
accredited liaison ofﬁcers for other regional countries (e.g., a liaison ofﬁcer
from one Nordic country may represent all Nordic countries in the host
country).
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In addition to the New York City example, other variations have also
begun emerging in recent years (see Figure 1), such as the employing of
liaison ofﬁcers from nonmember states to member-based international
organizations (e.g., non-EU member country liaison ofﬁcers appointed to
Europol), or the reverse—employing liaison ofﬁcers from international
organizations to nonmember states (e.g., ofﬁcers from Europol posted as
liaisons in Washington, DC). There is also increasing practice of liaison
ofﬁcers being appointed between international organizations, as is the case
with liaison ofﬁcer exchanges between Europol and Interpol. It has also
been noted in cases where a PLO has not yet been assigned, that another
existing LO (e.g., from the military) is temporarily assigned to liaise with
the local police. All of these newer trends in liaison ofﬁcer exchanges have
taken place in the post-9/11 era and all with an overt purpose of respond-
ing to transnational terrorism.
In addition to this diversifying of PLO appointment types, there
appears to be a trend for increasing numbers of PLO appointments post-
9/11. To get an idea about current numbers of PLOs as well as a sense of
trends in PLO appointments, e-mail requests for such information were
sent directly to 82 national police departments worldwide, Internet
searches were made for “police cooperation agreements” and “PLOs,”
and examinations were done of news reports, reports from international
organizations, and Web pages of police organizations. Results for numbers
of PLOs as of 2009 were as follows: Approximately 54 countries were
deploying PLOs to a total of 647 different sites (see Figure 2 and the
Appendix for detailed information). The number of sites does not neces-
sarily reﬂect the total number of actual ofﬁcers, however, because more
than one ofﬁcer may be appointed to a single liaison ofﬁce.
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In general, these numbers are most likely underestimates of the total
number of PLOs stationed around the world currently. When direct
contact with national police organizations was able to be established, it
tended to reveal more liaison agreements and postings than those found
in the Internet search. For example, no information about Lebanese police
agreements was available on the Internet, but an e-mail from Lebanese
authorities showed that they have recently established bilateral police
cooperation agreements with four other countries, and while the Internet
search showed only four PLOs stationed in Lebanon, the e-mail response
attested to a total of 15. Similarly, the Internet search found just eight
Slovak PLOs posted abroad, one foreign PLO in Slovakia, and a total of
eight police agreements between Slovakia and other countries. Direct
reporting by the Slovakian authorities, however, stated a total of 10 Slovak
PLOs abroad, 6 foreign PLOs in Slovakia, 9 foreign PLOs with agreements
to work on behalf of Slovakia, and 26 police agreements with other
countries.
Most importantly perhaps, responses from various police organizations
suggest that these numbers represent a dramatic rise in the popularity and
overall numbers of PLO appointments since 9/11, with clearly expressed
intentions to further increase the numbers of PLOs currently posted. For
example, Polish authorities predict increases from current numbers of
7–10 PLOs to about 15 in the next few years, and Slovakia also reported
intentions to open up two additional PLO posts in the coming year. The
trend can be seen in other countries as well. The Webpage of the New
Zealand Police announces that establishing new liaison posts is seen as an
FIGURE 2
Distribution of Countries Based on the Number of Appointment Sites
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important step in increasing capability to preempt and respond to terrorist
attacks, and the acting deputy commissioner of the New Zealand Police
has said that international cooperation is vital; therefore, their PLO
network has been spreading since 2001 (McKenzie-McLean 2006). The
international network of Australian PLOs has been growing to the point
that it now gives them reach into virtually every corner of the globe and
has been compared in its vastness to that of the United States, with refer-
ences to Australia being the “new regional policeman” (McPhedran 2004).
InAsia, theASEAN countries have several new efforts focused on improv-
ing cooperation on crimes, particularly terrorism, and the exchange of
PLOs is becoming an important component of this cooperation. The ﬁfth
ASEAN meeting in 2005 focused on the establishment of PLOs in the
member countries, and China has called for closer cooperation and for
greater exchange of PLOs (Xinhua News Agency 2007).
Overall, the United States seems to have the lead in appointing PLOs.4
This is in part because the United States has more than one agency
appointing ofﬁcers, each with a different focus. These include the Drug
Enforcement Agency, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, the
State Department, and the Department of Immigration and Naturalization.
The FBI alone has seen a 70% rise in the number of ofﬁces worldwide since
9/11, from 16 in 1992, to 44 in the early 1990s, to 57 after 9/11 (FBI Website
nd). Former FBI director Louis Freeh testiﬁed in post-9/11 hearings that
the FBI needed to “signiﬁcantly increase its international role and liaison
with our foreign law enforcement and security counterparts,” and in
reference to the 1996 Khobar bombings, stated that he could have
responded better if he had “had an FBI agent in Riyadh on June 25th, 1996,
when that tragedy occurred, who had the trust and the relationship that
the legate [liaison ofﬁcer] had three years later when he set up the ofﬁce”
(Freeh 2002).
The above survey of transgovernmental police efforts to combat tran-
snational terrorism suggests that PLOs are a prime example of an adapting
and vibrant area of substate response to transnational terrorism. PLOs are
not only the actors of an expanding area of activity but are also agents with
the potential capacity, legitimacy, and experience for pioneering innova-
tive and transformative practices to counter transnational terrorism. The
following section explores police liaisonships in greater detail in an
attempt to discover whether these ofﬁcers’ practices tend more toward
one side of an international/transnational spectrum than the other; if so,
why; and what insights this might hold for understanding the adaptive
and transformative capacity of the state.
PLOs Going Transnational
Bilateral appointments appear to be preferred by the PLOs primarily
because they allow police ofﬁcers more opportunities to take advantage of
what we could call the transnational characteristics of this transgovern-
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mental activity—characteristics that allow them to act when needed,
quickly, and creatively. In fact, PLOs take advantage of their transgovern-
mental status to draw on both sides of the response spectrum described
earlier, ranging from transnational (nonstate) to international (statist)
response mechanisms and practices. While maintaining the legitimacy,
strength, and operational capacity that comes from being a part of the
international, state system, PLOs are also establishing transnational links.
The key to this transnationality seems to lie in the fact that even when their
practices preserve their formally established and thus state-based nature,
and even though they continue to work on behalf of their country, bilat-
erally appointed PLOs are likely to be functioning informally. If ofﬁcial
cooperation takes place within bureaucratic circles, via agreements, con-
ventions, and legal documents, a liaison ofﬁcer’s informal activities evolve
around the time she or he spends with colleagues, sharing information
and experiences. Often communication begins at the personal level:
When I meet with other cops it’s easy to start talking because we all seem to have
the same problems. We’re all usually underpaid, and most of us have this feeling
that somehow we don’t get fully appreciated for the work we do. (North
American PLO, interviewed March 10, 2007)
Through regular, informal interaction, they seem to establish friend-
ships and develop trust, all of which contributes positively to the formal
efforts of cooperating on security issues.
Beyond the affective beneﬁts of this informality, many PLOs argue that
there are also pragmatic ones. In the process of working on requests or
cases, on-site liaison ofﬁcers who encounter procedural or bureaucratic
problems in sharing information can meet face-to-face and discuss ways of
overcoming this difﬁculty. For example, formal ofﬁcial procedures require
following institutional channels of police cooperation. These ofﬁcial pro-
cedures may demand that ofﬁcers notify higher-level administrators for
permission to exchange certain pieces of information, that they use ofﬁcial
written forms to request information or permission, or even that they use
speciﬁed formal language when requesting or sending messages. In order
to set up and conduct contacts between countries, there may be require-
ments to copy these messages to other state-related departments, from the
Interior Ministry to the Foreign Ministry or the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce:
When I want to get certain information about a case, I am supposed to submit
ofﬁcial requests in writing and these have to get OKed at several levels. The
problem is when we’re in the middle of an investigation it’s never so simple as
just one request. I need to get one answer, ask another question, get another
answer, and this back and forth is nearly impossible through ofﬁcial requests.
(Eurasian PLO, interviewed December 6, 2007)
Not only do these formalities inevitably slow down the process of
information exchange and cooperation, they may also reduce individuals’
willingness to share information, as they might be intimidated by the
necessity of writing formal, traceable requests. On the other hand, infor-
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mal cooperation can ease the process of communication about particular
cases and developments within them. By reducing some natural mistrust
and mutual hesitance during their informal communications, discussions
can turn to business in a more relaxed manner. Ofﬁcers talk about what
kind of developments they are seeing in criminal strategies, share ideas
about speciﬁc problems, and give each other information about what is
going on in speciﬁc cases:
After an explosion took place, we found that the perpetrator had lived in a
European Country before. We went to the liaison ofﬁcer of this country and
asked for information about this person and we got all the information.
However we could not have gotten the same information through letters of
rogatory from the judicial authorities of the same country. (Middle Eastern PLO,
December 7, 2007)
Sharing information in this way helps all parties see beyond their own
limited experiences and increases the chance of not only solving indi-
vidual cases but also of identifying emerging trends.
Enabling this informality is an underlying sense of community among
the PLOs and among the police in general (Marenin 2005)—a community
characterized by common experiences, common problems, and common
goals and recognized, at least rhetorically, by many police ofﬁcers, regard-
less of nationality:
Let me give you an example. I was in the Paris airport, in the luggage area, and
my wife took the ﬁrst bags and passed through customs. I was waiting for the
last bag, and eventually I realized that it wasn’t coming and I was going to have
to go somewhere else to report it. I needed to talk to my wife and tell her what
was happening. I could see her through a glass wall but I couldn’t get to her
without passing through customs. I asked some airport employees and they all
said it was forbidden for me to pass over and then come back through to deal
with the missing bag. Then I saw a policeman. I showed him my own police
badge and explained the situation to him. He immediately took me over, lifted
a barrier and escorted me through to my wife, and then he brought me back
through to deal with the bag. This is what being a policeman is all about. It’s
about looking at a situation, being practical and quick, and taking initiatives to
solve the problem. He could do that for me because he knew I was a cop too, and
he knew that I would do the same for him. This is our solidarity. (South Asian
police director, December 4, 2007)
This sense of community seems to breed trust and enable informality,
which arguably leads to practical solutions to the problems or crimes at
hand:
When you’re working on a case you can’t wait for permission for everything. It’s
the same way as if I’m chasing a criminal on the street I have the right to take
your car and chase him. My goal is to catch the criminal, and I’m not going to
stand and wait for someone to tell me how to do it or if I can do it or not. (North
American PLO, March 15, 2007)
The informal practices of the policing community also beneﬁt from
ofﬁcers generally holding a common view of the problem:
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I don’t see the issue as, like, “my” terrorists or “your” terrorists, I see them as
terrorists, and I see them as bad. If you’re a policeman and you want my help to
catch a terrorist, I’m going to do whatever I can to help you. (North American
PLO, March 12, 2007)
While one might question the degree to which this perceived apoliti-
cized view of terrorism as a “crime like any other crime” holds true in all
cases, it is undeniable that, to the extent to which it exists, such a “beyond-
the-state”mentality of apolice community canbeparticularly important for
building up the cooperation necessary to counter transnational terrorism.
Equally if not even more important than PLOs’ views on a sense of
community or shared approaches to crime is the broad perception that
PLOs seem to have of their evolving “liaisoning” practices. This evolving
capacity of liaisons is revealed when PLOs speak of how past practices
remain relevant for coping with new security problems:
When I started doing this work I remember how we spent most of our time
chasing drug cartels and networks and now we’re ordered to use most of our
signalling and most of our capacity for the Jihadist networks. We sometimes use
our old drug informants to ﬁnd out what they know about fake passports or
forged documents; things that might be used by terrorists. Back then our best
friends in the foreign police headquarters were the cops from narcotics; now our
best friends are cops from the counter-terrorism and intelligence departments.
(European PLO, January 17, 2008)
The sense of evolving practices also comes through when PLOs talk
speciﬁcally about current liaisonship efforts for countering terrorism:
Terror has a training characteristic. We were really compartmentalized in the
past, but terror and political crimes has forced us to be familiar with all kinds of
illegal international activity and now I think we’re better prepared and ready for
future changes. I think it has something to do with terror as a crime. I remember
that as drug ofﬁcers we used to say that no matter how much we did, some
drugs had to be let through to meet the demand. Our job was just to stop
excessive trafﬁcking. There was a kind of limit psychologically against doing the
job to the fullest. Countering terror needs to try and be 100% successful, so
people try to go further and do better. This means that as liaisons we’re really
trying to keep our practices sharp. (North American PLO, March 21, 2007)
Still further evidence of changes in the nature of liaisonships and the
role that they have come to play comes through in these words by a
Turkish PLO:
The ﬁrst time we went to Europe I was ofﬁcially named as a “temporary
position,” that’s how my position looked at in the budget department. Now my
position and my colleagues is a permanent one. It’s even in the law. No one asks
now if my position will end and no one asks questions, they just know another
liaison will come after me and another one. Even within the police ourselves,
police cadets now realize that liaison posts are real and permanent, and they
start to study languages to compete better for these posts. (March 11, 2008)
As noted earlier, the practice of posting PLOs to other countries or to
international organizations is by no means a new one, but it is one that
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does seem to be changing in nature in response to a changing nature of
threats. When transnational threats were only sporadic, PLO appoint-
ments were made in an ad hoc manner to meet the challenge. With the
spread of international organized crime and drug trafﬁcking, the fre-
quency of PLO use rose, and various structures and practices were put
into place, which are now being used in the ﬁght against transnational
terrorism. The “newness” of police liaisonships is not that they have just
been discovered but rather that they are now becoming a recognized and
institutionalized practice for responding to transnational threats of all
kinds.
Overall, when we look at the patterns of PLO behaviors and convic-
tions, we see that PLOs’ activities are deﬁning for them a position that
cannot easily be categorized as precisely transnational or international. In
their movement between the two ends of such a response spectrum,
they—or more precisely, their practices of liaisonship—are instead
samples of a form of transgovernmental activity in global security. The
deﬁning characteristics of their activity are their dynamism, ﬂexibility, and
adaptiveness combined with traditional elements like state capacity and
legitimacy. Because theirs remains an expanding but as yet unclearly
deﬁned practice, it has the potential to disturb existing actors and patterns.
The most obvious sign of such a possibility is the tension still occasion-
ally observed between diplomats (representing the international) and
PLOs.5 In some cases, countries establish police liaisonships as an impor-
tant part of their diplomatic relationships. The U.S. State Department, for
example, is increasingly involved in international police matters because
the international crime problem is ofﬁcially viewed as a “component of
foreign policy and national security, not just as a law enforcement issue”
(Deﬂem 2001), and police cooperation programs are “part of the general
foreign policy of the US” (Marenin 2001). For other countries, the relation-
ship is neither as intertwined nor as clearly deﬁned—a situation that may
grant the PLO greater freedom but may also lead to tensions. One liaison
ofﬁcer from a European country described the relationship with his dip-
lomatic mission as follows: “MyAmbassador asked me quite a lot of times
what I am doing as a liaison ofﬁcer. And he still wonders why our country
needs me” (interviewed December 15, 2007). A Middle Eastern liaison
ofﬁcer complained about his ambassador, saying that he “did not want to
give me a room at the Embassy. He doesn’t see my work necessary”
(interviewed March 22, 2007).
These potential contradictions may reﬂect the hybrid nature of police
liaisons—national representatives, working side-by-side with foreign
police ofﬁcers, and part of a global crime-ﬁghting community. By contrast,
the status of traditional representatives of the “international,” such as
diplomats, is very clearly deﬁned. It is not surprising that the traditional
actors of the international would be uncomfortable with the multilevel
identities and capacities of the PLOs. This multilevel character of the PLOs
seems to open up the potential for more relaxed and informal practices.
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PLOs have formal legitimacy but informal capacity. It is this bridging of
the formal/informal gap in particular that may make them successful
actors in the balancing of the international, state-centric realm and the
transnational, multicentric one, and thus potentially effective responders6
to transnational terrorism.
Building Blocks of Statist Transnationalism
There seems little doubt among academicians and practitioners in general
that the nature of security threats in the twenty-ﬁrst century has under-
gone and continues to undergo changes. We are in an era in which states
as unitary actors can no longer be considered either the primary sources of
insecurity or necessarily the primary means of response to security
threats. Instead, the world faces threats from a far broader range of actors,
and along a much wider range of issues than interstate conﬂict. What
remains a far more contentious issue is the question of the appropriate
response to these new security threats: Who or what is best poised to
counter them? Using what means? Are new actors and processes emerg-
ing to respond to these threats or are traditional actors adapting their
means and stepping up to the plate?
Some answers or parts of answers to these questions are becoming
clear. The appropriate and necessary response to transnational threats
must also have transnational dimensions, and this demands cooperation
on an international level and beyond—ultimately, a new kind of gover-
nance for transnational (in)security. In terms of agency to materialize this
cooperation, the fact is that while most transnational security challenges
originate and ﬂourish in the constantly expanding transnational space,
states remain in one way or another the primary responders. The resulting
gap begs for an institutionalization of security-providing actors and pro-
cesses for the transnational realm. The dynamics of the transnational space
have thus far proven insufﬁcient at producing such an effective and self-
sustaining institutionalization from within. Private armies, institutes, or
various other nonstate actors, who claim that they hold the potential to be
part of such a response solution, remain for now premature in their
physical capacity, and more importantly, have yet to establish credibility
and legitimacy for such a global public service. In essence, we are left with
the conclusion that the state—or some form of transgovernmental
capacity—is the only realistic agent currently able to expand effectively
into the transnational space and, by adapting and reorienting itself,
counter rapidly expanding transnational security challenges, particularly
violent ones.
There appear to be moves on the part of some substate actors to do
precisely this. Unwittingly perhaps, one of the pioneer builders of tran-
snational (in)security governance are the police, and on the front lines of
this evolution are the PLOs. Police liaisons can be considered as a sign of
a new kind of security governance, as they expand into new territories and
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assume and adapt new types of functions and practices, but do so with the
strength that comes from statist legitimacy, prestige, and capacity. With
their adaptations of standard procedures and pragmatic evolution of
formal practices, they are merging the advantages of statist capacity with
the adaptiveness of evolving transnational security practices. In doing so
they are allowing us to identify emerging signs of what we can call “statist
transnationalism.”
Like transgovernmentalism, statist transnationalism describes the
activities of substate elements acting in a transnational manner but differs
with respect to the nature of these subunits’ autonomy from the central
state authority. In its original sense, transgovernmentalism presumes inef-
fective central control of the substate units. This lack of effective control
allows the building up of informal transgovernmental working relations,
which serve as the preconditions for an eventual “transgovernmental
coalition building,” in which the collaborating subunits from the different
countries actually work together to inﬂuence international governance
decisions. In contrast, cases like that of the PLOs show subunit contacts
that are generally encouraged by the high-level ofﬁcials as means for
improving the effectiveness of international policies. Such activity can be
perhaps more accurately described as statist transnationalism because the
“state” remains emphasized. In this case, the relative autonomy from the
state is at the level of practice, or what Keohane and Nye referred to as
“transgovernmental policy coordination.” In “true” transgovernmental-
ism, “autonomy” encompasses the identity of the actors themselves, and
their presumed ultimate desire to strengthen their own positions vis-à-vis
other subunits or the central authority itself. In statist transnationalism,
autonomy is practiced on the basis of need, to effectively conduct the
transnational nature of the mission.
At the same time, statist transnationalism seems to be a dynamic
process, one that is in a sense building itself as it goes. As the PLOs
cooperate more to solve cases, the transnationalist characteristics of the
security governance also grow. Therefore, in principle, it is possible that
the more the value of this practice is recognized as effective and therefore
indispensable, the statist input (meaning statist legitimacy, operational
capacity, and identity) will be less necessary. Does this mean that PLOs
will move or are moving toward “true” transgovernmentalism as origi-
nally deﬁned? The scope of this research does not yet suggest that these
pioneering actors have either the intention or the true capacity to move
beyond the crucial state input. This is due to the nature of the security
threat they are ﬁghting, a threat that requires an operational capacity that
actors other than nation states are unable to accumulate and use. This
includes everything from the most sophisticated high-tech equipment, to
ready-to-die personnel, to the legal immunity that states can provide.
Because of the high risks and demands involved in combating transna-
tional terrorism, in this part of the security sector, there remains a need to
label transgovernmental activity as statist transnationalism. In general, the
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adapted procedures and evolutionary practices that are labeled here as
statist transnationalism can be said to evolve around three main charac-
teristics: demonopolization of international security cooperation, infor-
mality, and depoliticization.
Demonopolization of International Security Cooperation
The ﬁrst pattern to emerge when we look at the expansion of police liaison
practices is the overall increase in unconventional—in this case, substate—
institutions or groups participating in the governance of transnational
security issues. With their increased presence we see a demonopolization
of international security cooperation, away from the days when such prac-
tices were dominated by national governments, foreign services, diplo-
mats, and members of the intelligence community. Substate entities that
were never a part of political international or transnational struggles are
now taking more assertive and primary roles, such as can be seen in the
example of local police departments engaging in cross-national security
cooperation, through different forms of liaisonships as well as innovative
practices like hiring nonprofessionals in advisory positions or as transla-
tors. The actions of these substate entities can be seen as signs of moving
beyond traditional national constraints of viewing security issues as
purely national level concerns, as detached from substate or nonstate
involvement, or of being skeptical of other national interests—in the effort
to address a common, transnational problem.
They may also be seen as having a long-term positive impact as their
efforts provide impetus to traditional international agencies to reenergize
and reorient themselves into the new transnational security environment.
Basically, competition resulting from a demonopolization of security gov-
ernance has the potential of bringing about more innovative and adaptive
practices for transnational security cooperation. On the other hand, in the
short term, a possible negative implication could be that competition
between different groups could lead to coordination problems and could
be advantageous for the targeted elements, for example, actors of global
terrorism. Also in the short term, there is the obvious risk that demonopo-
lization might not be smooth because high ofﬁces may dismiss these
“junior” ofﬁces’ capacity/practice at the international level—as reﬂected
in the tension between diplomats and PLOs.
Informality
PLOs in the ﬁeld attest to how face-to-face contacts and cooperation
between people involved in security governance has increased since 9/11.
They further note that these personal, informal contacts have been central
to a growing reciprocity between substate entities such as national police
organizations. If traditional national security contacts between countries
can be considered as “dehumanized,” these personal contacts are a way of
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“rehumanizing” security. In the world of the practitioner PLO, a national
security issue like transnational terrorism, originally conceived as a part of
politicized “high” politics, has merged with the realm of low politics by
being seen as a criminal act. In this way, a formerly “high” politics issue
has become a function of local, substate actors, alongside high-ofﬁce states-
people and the military. Interestingly, these informal face-to-face contacts
that are generally initiated in response to an immediate transnational
security challenge also appear to be giving opportunities to the actors
involved to discover other venues of cooperation. For example, the infor-
mal networks that were built up to combat drug trafﬁcking have been
adapted after 9/11 for countering the global Jihadist challenge. These now
strengthened informal networks can feasibly be utilized for future tran-
snational security challenges. It is possible to anticipate, therefore, a spill-
over impact, in which cooperation on other transnational issues can also be
realized, meaning that transnational (in)security governance has a
dynamic potential to grow as the pathways of transnational security rela-
tionships are further consolidated.
The informality that these “cop-to-cop” practices employ appears to be
used to go beyond the initial mistrust levels that traditionally poison the
potential for global security cooperation. Still, one cannot ignore the sense
that PLOs are probably more comfortable reporting such positive informal
friendships than they would be reporting what they may actually experi-
ence in a foreign land, trying to work within a foreign institution. Surely
there are many cultural—both ethnic and professional—differences that
challenge the advantages of the informality argument. A critical example
of this might be a foreign PLO’s perception that some of the “local” or host
police with whom he is working might have sympathetic feelings for the
“enemy” (e.g., in Muslim states like Egypt or Pakistan). The foreign PLO
might even question the potential of actual penetration by that enemy into
the local forces. Even if unsubstantiated, such doubts would be devastat-
ing for the possibility for trust and informality that is so often mentioned
and praised.
Depoliticization of Security
Finally, developments within police and PLO practice make clear how a
depoliticization of security exchanges is important for an emerging tran-
snational (in)security governance. Starting with the transnational threats
themselves, the less politically deﬁned the threat, and subsequently, the
less politically formulated the countering frameworks and structures,
the better the chances are for security cooperation and governance. When
the focused-upon threat is viewed in a less contentious and political
way—for example, as a crime to be controlled—the chances for mobilizing
and overcoming obstacles to security cooperation are greater. Police ofﬁc-
ers’ professional focus on terrorist threats as “crimes” rather than political
acts improves their chances of being able to work with colleagues from
TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM MEETS SECURITY 73
around the world in spite of national, ideological, gender, or racial differ-
ences. To the extent they are able to achieve such a common, depoliticized
perspective, the criminal then becomes for them the sole “other” and the
common target. The police become a common “us,” without allegiances to
any particular state or afﬁliation, and are more likely able to maintain the
trust and commitment necessary to cooperate fully and effectively.
Our interviews with acting PLOs lead one to believe that depoliticiza-
tion is at work. It is not easy, however, to measure the degree of this
depoliticization and, frankly, the genuineness of their comments and of
their discourse of “us—the police versus them—the terrorists.” Does this
discourse continue when the PLO returns home and engages with his or
her colleagues there? The professional interaction with other police is
often reduced to highly focused, technical discussions about, for example,
a particular terrorist cell’s activities. They do not seem to discuss historical
experiences with terrorism or enter into deeper discussions of the root
causes of terrorism. One wonders whether the presumed “depoliticiza-
tion” would carry through at that level and whether, therefore, the poten-
tial for “repoliticization” might be equally valid. It is one thing for a
European and a Middle Eastern PLO to discuss the daily movements of an
alleged local al Qaeda cell and quite another for them to talk about the role
of the Palestinian conﬂict or the American action in Iraq with respect to
that cell’s motives.
Conclusion
The main question posed at the beginning of this article was whether states
are proving capable of adapting their response practices to meet new,
transnational security challenges, or whether a gap between the threats
being now posed and states’ capacity to respond to them is widening. The
evidence here suggests that states, via their support and promotion of
liaisonship practices in the critical realm of security, are showing their
awareness of the need to adapt and are, in principle, adapting. This adapt-
ability claim assumes a disaggregated understanding of the state, in which
substate actors—still representing the state—are taking pioneering roles.
Certain subunits of the state structure are proving better equipped to
adapt to the needs of transnational activity and are doing so at the level of
practice, for purposes of efﬁciency. As units of the overall state structure,
these subunits’ transnational practices represent change in the state. The
fact that these subunits are going transnational without openly claiming
their autonomy from the state speaks to the resilience of the state as a
primary actor in international relations.
It is not a stretch to conclude that an apparent growth in a seemingly ad
hoc practice of PLOs is evidence of states’ capacity to adapt in response to
transnational security threats. First, as shown above, PLOs are no longer
an ad hoc phenomenon. Second, we must keep in mind that these moves
are being made in the crucial sector of security. States are made most
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conservative, suspicious, uncooperative, and self-help driven by their
instinct for survival—an instinct that is most obviously reﬂected in secu-
rity issues. If, therefore, there is evidence that states are extending insti-
tutional capacities beyond traditional spaces, that they are promoting and
consolidating nontraditional patterns in cooperative behaviors, it should
be argued that this is a novel move and is a sign of transforming gover-
nance into the transnational on the part of those states—in other words, a
reinventing of government.
Other areas of study (e.g., economics, law, health) have looked at the
governance of transnational issues, observed a diversifying of governance,
and concluded that the state as we know it is in decline. The increasingly
independent activities of PLOs might appear as yet another example of
such decline, but this is arguably incorrect because the intentions of the
actor in question are still state oriented. The independence of these sub-
state actors, described here as “transnationalization,” is being done in
order to have more efﬁciency to perform the job, not necessarily to build
up stronger transnational loyalties—which may conﬂict with national
ones. The situation is quite different from those substate (or nonstate)
activities for issues like the environment, human rights, or health, which
represent powerful, universally accepted norms and values, which may
supercede actors’ national loyalties. PLOs may be working together across
borders, but their ultimate goals are aimed at protecting their state and its
citizens. They remain pragmatic and are aware that without the state and
all that it entails (its means, structures, institutions, legitimacy), their own
transnational maneuvers and ﬂexibility may not be enough to meet the
transnational security challenge.
One can argue that states, through an internal “loosening” characterized
by giving greater freedom and power to sub- and nonstate entities, are
allowing a horizontal expansion of governance into the transnational space.
However, as long as such internal loosening does not present destructive
intragovernmental tensions, transnational achievements can be credited to
states and their successful adaptation. By loosening, the state reveals and
rediscovers its potential to become more efﬁcient transnationally. Some
scholarship only concentrating on the initial loosening may prematurely
conclude that states are in decline, but the evidence in this article shows
that it can also indicate a restructuring process for new formations. In this
case, we see the evolving of transnational liasionships as signs of a better
developed and consolidated form of public governance.
It has been suggested—although not shown—that transgovernmental-
ism is not an appropriate framework for looking at high politics (Raustiala
2002, fn. 12). This attempt at exploring transgovernmental practices in a
high-politics issue like national security suggests that this may be true, and
therefore an alternative term of “statist transnationalism” is proposed.
Statist transnationalism is in essence transgovernmentalism without the
disconnection and deﬁance of state capacity that the latter presumes. Will
statist transnationalism among security providers turn into transgovern-
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mentalism in the sense of a growing autonomy among the substate actors,
an increasing lack of effective state control, and a growing effort on their
part to inﬂuence governance decisions? There is at least some reason to
suggest that for many countries, the answer is no.
Similar to the uneven impact that globalization and expanding transna-
tional relations have on states, those states’ responses to transnational
forces are not all the same. “True” transgovernmental responses, in the
sense of some degree of autonomy gaining by substate actors, are more
likely to be seen in developed countries. In the developing world,
response to security challenges still tends to be handled by centralized
state forces, which are less likely to allow autonomy on the part of their
substate actors. When we do see instances of real disaggregation of power
in a developing or less developed state, it is more often the sign of a failing
or failed state rather than transgovernmentalism. As these more central-
ized states must still ﬁnd ways of responding to new transnational security
challenges, “statist-transnational” solutions may seem a feasible option.
Evidence that this may be the case can again be found in the words of the
PLOs interviewed in this study, who were highly diverse in terms of their
national backgrounds and the governance systems of those nations yet
reported common practices and attitudes, which constituted statist-
transnationalism rather than transgovernmentalism.
The possibilities for transgovernmentalism are also weakened for the
same reasons mentioned above regarding the risk of repoliticization of
practices if PLOs were to move beyond the technical discussions of on-the-
ground activity. Repoliticization means in a sense renationalizing, and
thus a probable maintaining of ties with national, central powers. Trans-
governmentalism entails a weakening of these ties and an eventual desire
to undermine or at least circumvent them. The potential of repoliticization
is always close at hand in the case of sensitive security issues like transna-
tional terrorism, and this potential lessens the likelihood of a materializa-
tion of true transgovernmental practices in the security realm. Practices of
statist transnationalism in the governance of evolving security threats,
however, as they are based on practical need, seem likely to continue and
even grow in the foreseeable future. States and the transnational world
converge for a practical need, which presents us with signs for long-term
patterns in transnational governance.
Notes
1. For an overview of the nature of transnational threats see Smith (2002). For
more focused studies on environmental issues as transnational threats see,
for example, Barnett (2001), Dalby (2002), and McNeill (2005); on the spread
of disease see Brower and Chalk (2003), Caballero-Anthony (2008), Kittelsen
(2007), and Ostergard (2002); on migration see Collyer (2006), Faist (2006),
and Lutterbeck (2006); on transnational crime see Swanstrom (2007); and on
the rise of transnational terrorism see Enders and Sandler (2000), Sanderson
(2004), Sandler and Enders (2005), and Wiktorowicz (2001).
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2. While disagreements remain over the ultimate signiﬁcance of these forces,
most would argue that their importance has grown relative to the Cold War
era. For pioneering works on these transformations and forces see Rosenau
(1990, 1997, 2003).
3. Although not speciﬁcally addressed under a heading of transgovernmental
activities, some work being done on international police activities could be
considered as indirect discussions of transgovernmental activities connected
with security issues. For example, see Bigo (2000), Deﬂem (2002, 2006), and
Sheptycki (2000, 2002).
4. The apparent predominance of American (and other developed world) liai-
sons might lead to concern over the possibility of an imbalance in PLO
practices, with only limited countries being able to beneﬁt from the
exchange of information and valuable intelligence. In the case of transna-
tional security issues, the concern may not be as relevant as with other
issues. First, security is often prioritized in many poor countries, so money
for PLOs is often found. Second, in the case of countering transnational
threats, poor and rich countries alike have something to offer—it may often
be that the poorer countries have valuable intelligence information. To gain
access, the richer countries need the permission to place their own PLOs and
might be willing, for that permission, to support the poorer countries,
including those countries’ PLOs. Such trade-offs have been common prac-
tice in international drug enforcement. While the money may therefore be
found for poorer nations to send and support PLOs of their own, the real
problem may actually be whether there are appropriate people to ﬁll the
PLO positions—for example, police ofﬁcers with the language skills and
international experience/personal adaptability to be able to establish good
communication with Western counterparts on Western soil.
5. In fact, the more obvious place to look for such tension should be between
the police and traditional security actors in counterterrorism, namely,
members of national intelligence services. Unfortunately, it is extremely dif-
ﬁcult to gather data on actors in or practices of the intelligence services, so
one can only speculate how the interaction between them unfolds.
6. With respect to questions of effectiveness, again, it is impossible to measure
precisely either the “effectiveness” of PLOs or the relative effectiveness of
PLOs versus that of the presumably still more traditional practices of the
intelligence services. Instead, we have to look for signs in other ways, for
example, by considering that governmental decision makers are continuing
to support liaison practices and are doing so in growing numbers. At
minimum, therefore, it can be presumed that traditional approaches alone
are no longer seen as adequate to combat transnational problems and that
PLOs are considered as potentially useful supplements to those practices.
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Appendix
Country
# of
PLOs Country
# of
PLOs
1 USA (DEA and FBI) 122
2 France (Including 56
SCTIP delegations)
72
29 Czech Republic 3
30 Estonia 3
3 Germany 49
31 Israel 3
4 Britain 45
32 Japan 3
5 Italy 45
33 Portugal 3
6 Spain 36
34 Switzerland 3
7 Australia 28
35 Colombia 2
8 Netherlands 25
36 Croatia 2
9 Canada 23
37 Lithuania 2
10 Belgium 17
38 Rep. of Korea 2
11 Austria 15
39 Albania 1
12 Sweden 15
40 Azerbaijan 1
13 Belarus 13
41 Bolivia 1
14 Slovakia 10
42 Bosnia and
Herzegovina
1
15 Denmark 9 43 Chile 1
16 Greece 9 44 Former Yug. Rep. of
Macedonia
1
17 Ukraine 9
45 Iran 118 New Zealand 7
46 Luxembourg 119 Poland 7
47 Malaysia 120 Turkey 7
48 Mexico 121 China 6
49 Pakistan 122 Norway 6
50 Saudi Arabia 123 Romania 6
51 Slovenia 124 Finland 5
52 Tunisia 125 Hungary 5
53 United Arab Emirates 126 Ireland 5
54 Venezuela 127 Russian Federation 5
28 Bulgaria 4
Total 647
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